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SELIG HARRISON'S MODEL & INDIA'S NUCLEAR POSTURE 
Will it serve India's interests? 
By ARVIND KUMAR IN recent months, an interest-ing study on India's nuclear posture has been conducted 
by Mr Selig S Harrison, currently 
with the Woodrow Wilson Centre 
in Washington. It has given fresh 
impetus to the ongoing nuclear de-
bate and highlighted the prospects 
of a US-South Asia nuclear 'trade-
off in general and US-India nu-
clear 'bargain' in particular. How 
far this study will influence key 
policy-makers in the US vis-a-vis 
India is a question that needs to 
be addressed. 
Five components 
Unlike many Americans, Mr 
Harrison in his study links insist-
ence on nuclear restraint in South 
Asia with a demand for steps 
towards global nuclear disarma-
ment. His postulates on a US nu-
clear 'bargain' with India have 
five components. First, India 
should test and accede to the Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) and comply with the key 
clauses made in the treaty. 
This, however, may not be ac-
ceptable to India and the US will 
also find it difficult to pursue and 
maintain closer co-operaion. The 
) Indian establishment knows very 
'well that US law mandates sanc-
tions if India tests a nuclear de-
• vice. All aid to India would cease, 
the American representative in 
(the World Bank and IMF may vote 
against any loans to India, no 
American bank would be allowed 
to lend to India and technology 
flows to India would be tightened 
severely. This would prove to be 
a political and economic disaster 
triggering a run on the rupee. 
Even if India tests a device, it may 
not accede to the CTBT in its pres-
ent form because not even one nu-
clear warhead would be abolished 
under this treaty. There is also a 
feeling In India that if India signs 
the CTBT, its security will be en-
dangered. India's security threat 
comes from nuclear China and the 
Slno-Paklstanl nuclear collab-
oration. This is the reason why In-
dia wants to keep its nuclear opt-
ions open. 
Secondly, Mr Harrison suggests 
that India should accept Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safeguards, currently 
limited to Tarapur, to all nuclear-
power reactors and also sign the 
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 
(FMCT). This in India's point of 
view is also unacceptable. India is 
of the view that despite technology 
denials and existing export con-
trols like those contained in the 
Zangger Committee guidelines, 
London Suppliers Guidelines 
(later expanded to the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group), the Missile 
Technology Control Regime and 
several other non-proliferation ar-
rangements, India was able to 
progress in the field of nuclear 
power and built several indigen-
ous reactors (like MAPS at 
Kalpakkam, Narora in UP and 
Kakrapar in Gujarat. Rawatbhata 
III and IV in Rajasthan are under 
construction and Kaiga I and II 
are under construction at 
Karnataka). 
IAEA safeguards 
India may not be amenable to 
IAEA safeguards on anything that 
has been indigenously construct-
ed. Reliable sources, however, con-
firm that if India receives new 
plants and new technologies it 
would accept IAEA safeguards. 
With regard to the FMCT, the 
scope of the treaty till date 
(whether the treaty is retrospec-
tive or prospective) has not been 
defined. Hence, India for the time 
being, instead of pronouncing that 
it will not sign, should adopt a 
wait-and-watch policy. 
India should also not forget that 
it co-sponsored the FMCT resol-
ution with 30 other countries. The 
resolution was passed 
unanimously by the United Na-
tion's General Assembly in De-
cember 1993. India should also be 
aware that stringent high-tech ex-
port curbs are going to remain a 
reality for the foreseable future. 
Thirdly, it was suggested by Mr 
Harrison that India should not ex-
port nuclear technology and a 
commitment should be made by 
legislation. The question here is 
why the US is seemingly so intimi-
dated by India's technological de-
velopment. 
Export policy 
It is a well-known fact that uptil 
now India has not exported nu-
clear technology at any level. 
Today, without being a member of 
the NSG, MTCR or the Australia 
Group, India, through its export 
policy, is honouring the guidelines 
of these multilateral technology 
control arrangements. India does 
not appear to have any plan in the 
near future to export nuclear tech-
nology. Hence, this suggestion of 
Mr Harrison's is in conformity 
with India's policies. 
Instead of asking India not to ex-
port nuclear technology, the US 
should persuade India to formally 
join NSG, MTCR or any other non-
proliferation regime (as a full 
member of these groups) by offer-
ing as an incentive a number of 
dual-use export licensing benefits. 
Such benefits could include Gen-
eral Cocom Trade (GCT), General 
Co-operating Governments (GCG) 
and General Free World (GFW) 
general licences, a liberalised dis-
tribution licence and expedited ex-
port-licence processing facilities. 
Under a GCT general licence, In-
dia would have access to most 
items on the commerce commod-
ity control list of the Department 
of Commerce. A GCG general li-
cence would allow it to buy with-
out Department of Commerce ap-
proval items controlled for nation-
al security reasons, except for 
supercomputers. 
India may be willing to co-oper-
ate with multilateral control re-
gimes, even though they have con-
sistently targeted India, if it sees 
no conflict with its national secur-
ity interests. 
The next component of Mr 
Harrison's model is Interesting. It 
says that If India accepts all the 
three proposals explained earlier, 
then the US in return could aban-
don the "rollback" objective and 
llft> the ban on nuclear reactor 
sates to India. This can never hap-
pen because India currently is not 
going to abide by the dictates of 
any nuclear weapon power. India 
cannot accept full-scope safe-
guards until and unless the nu-
clear powers also accept them. 
In Mr Harrison's fifth and last 
postulate, it is suggested that 
Washington lead the nuclear 
states in making deep cuts in nu-
clear arsenals. The proposal envis-
ages that India absorb up to US 
$60 billion in foreign nuclear reac-
tor supplies. This would prove 
beneficial for the commercially 
languishing US nuclear industry 
and India would give the US sig-
nificant weightage In one of the 
most sensitive sectors of the In-
dian economy. 
It has to be recognised that till 
date no attempt has been made In 
India to develop an integrated 
strategy to accelerate India's econ-
omic development by using Inter-
national economic and technologi-
cal resources, particularly those of 
the US. The time is ripe for India 
to exploit its potential. 
Flawed proposal 
There is, however, nothing new 
in the model. Both the US and In-
dia need clear thinking on their 
nuclear strategies. The proposal is* 
severely flawed. Mr Harrison has 
not anywhere addressed the real 
factors underlying India's nuclear 
pursuit. India's genuine security 
considerations have not been 
highlighted. What India needs now 
is greater confidence in its own 
ability to deal with the outside 
world, especially the nuclear 
powers. It is India's sovereign 
right to reject an international 
agreement which is not in its na-
tional interest. 
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